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CHAPTER 17 
Insurance 
GEORGE K. GARDNER 
We are sometimes told that we are witnessing a struggle between 
the idea of "private enterprise" and the idea of "the service state." 
Perhaps our efforts would be more constructive if we thought of our-
selves as engaged in the adventure of creating a truly cooperative 
Commonwealth. To the extent that the new law of the year just 
passed reflects the latter of these two approaches it displays improve-
ment in our methods of carrying on our common affairs. To the 
extent that it reflects the former it displays friction, lost motion, and a 
conflict of governing ideas. 
A. LEGISLATION 
§17.1. Comprehensive household insurance under a single policy. 
A fire insurance company may now - by a single policy - insure all 
the buildings and personal property which m~ke up the physical 
equipment of a single household "from any peril proper to insure 
against in this commonwealth, and may, in addition, insure against 
the legal liability of the insured or of members of his household aris-
ing out of non-business pursuits, and insure with respect to medical, 
surgical, and hospital expenses." 1 This act will make it much simpler 
than it is at present for the head of a family to provide for the eco-
nomic security of his household and - by reducing the volume of 
necessary computation, paper work, and negotiation - should enable 
the insurance industry to reduce the cost very substantially. The 
possibilities of this statute seem quite revolutionary. On its face it 
seems to permit a single company, by a single policy, (1) to insure the 
home against fire, flood, windstorm, and all other physical disasters; 
(2) to insure every member of the family against liability while 
driving the family motor car; and (3) to assume the responsibilities 
of the Blue Cross and the Blue Shield. Probably the ambitions of 
the draftsmen were not so broad. The "Homeowners Policy B," de-
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veloped by the Multiple Peril Rating Organization, and already used 
in California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ver-
mont,2 which is currently offered in Massachusetts under this statute, 
seems to aim at achieving the first of these results; but it expressly 
disclaims the second; and liability for medical, surgical, and hospital 
expenses is limited to those incurred in consequence of accidents to 
strangers occurring on the insured premises or resulting from the ac-
tivities of the insured. 
§17.2. Group life insurance. The statutes relative to group life 
insurancel have been amended by enactments, (a) which require 
every company issuing a group policy to a bank or other creditor on 
the lives of its debtors to "furnish to the policy-holder for delivery to 
each debtor a form which will contain a statement that the life of 
the debtor is insured under the policy and that any death benefit 
... shall be applied to reduce or extinguish the indebtedness"; 2 and 
(b) which reduce the minimum number of employees who may be 
insured under a group policy from twenty-five to ten.3 
§17.3. Group insurance extended to public employees. The General 
Court has created a commission which is directed to negotiate with 
appropriate private insurance organizations one or more group poli-
cies providing "life insurance ... accidental death and dismember-
ment insurance ... and ... general or blanket hospital, surgical, 
and medical insurance" for the Commonwealth's employees and their 
dependents. l Every employee who does not withdraw from the plan 
is to be covered, and the premiums are to be paid one-half by the 
Commonwealth and one-half by deductions from the salaries of the 
employees. "The amount of group life insurance on each employee 
shall be two thousand dollars ... the amount of ... accidental 
death and dismemberment insurance . . . shall be two thousand dol-
lars. The amount of the hospital, surgical and medical benefits . . . 
shall be determined by the commission." 2 Counties, cities, towns, 
and districts are permitted to provide similar group insurance for 
their employees.3 
§17.4. Excess liability insurance for cities and towns. One incon-
spicuous piece of legislation deserves more notice than it is likely to 
receive. As every lawyer knows, Massachusetts municipalities are not 
liable for torts committed by their officers or employees. They are not 
liable to actions of tort brought against them by their employees; nor 
are they liable to indemnify their officers or employees against tort ac-
2 A sample of this policy may be found in Patterson, Cases and Materials on In-
surance 776 (3d ed. 1955). 
§17.2. 1 G.L., c. 175, §§133-138. 
2 Acts of 1955, c. 169. 
3 Id., c. 171. 
§17.3. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 628. 
2 Id., c. 628, §6. 
:I Id., c. 760. 
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tions against them. They may, however, by vote of the appropriating 
authority, indemnify their officers and employees against particular 
tort actions; 1 they may, by like vote, purchase liability insurance to 
indemnify their employees against tort actions; 2 and they may under-
take to provide workmen's compensation for their employees,3 in 
which case they may make annual appropriations to a reserve fund 
to meet workmen's compensation claims.4 The General Laws have 
now been amended to permit municipalities to purchase insurance 
either (a) against all the workmen's compensation claims to which 
they may be subject, or (b) against the possibility that workmen's 
compensation may exceed the maximum which the municipality is 
prepared to bear.5 It would seem that this principle might well be 
extended to tort claims against municipal officers and employees. At 
present a city or town must elect between purchasing full liability 
insurance or exposing its officers, employees, and taxpayers to the risk 
of having suddenly to deal with formidable and unforeseen claims. 
Would not acceptance of a reasonable degree of responsibility for 
tort claims both by individual employees and by taxpayers conduce to 
good morale? If so, the insurance industry has an opportunity to 
render a public service by providing insurance against excess losses 
to municipalities as it now does very widely to large private concerns. 
The whole subject of municipal tort liability, and of insuring 
against it, is one to which the General Court might well give some 
thought. It is, perhaps, not generally known in Massachusetts that 
the State of New York "assumes liability and consents to have the 
same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied 
to actions ... against individuals or corporations"; 6 and that the 
New York Court of Appeals has held that this statute makes munici-
palities liable to the same extent.7 Massachusetts legislation in the 
same direction, accompanied by appropriate use of liability insurance, 
might conduce to the simpler and more orderly conduct of our af-
fairs. 
§17.5. Motor vehicle insurance. A number of sources of friction 
and annoyance in the operation of the motor vehicle laws have been 
smoothed out. Fleet owners may now cover not only their motor 
vehicles, but also their trailers, by a single bond.1 The provisions for 
continuing motor vehicle insurance after the death of the insured 
during the policy period are extended to include death at any time 
after the policy has been issued.2 Appeals from refusals to issue com-
§17.4. 1 G.L., c. 41, §§100, 100A. 
2 Id., c. 40, §5(1). 
3 Id., c. 152, §69. 
4 Id., c. 40, §13A. 
5 Acts of 1955, c. 385. 
6 Court of Claims Act §8. 
7 Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945). 
§17.5. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 172. 
2 Id., c. 283. 
" 
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pulsory liability insurance policies, or from the cancellation of such 
policies, may now be heard by the Municipal Court of the City of 
Boston, as well as by the Superior Court.3 
The legislature also amended the merit ratihb ~ystem by providing 
that "No points shall be assessed against the operating record of the 
owner of a motor vehicle as a result of any violation unless the owner 
is the operator thereof" with seven specified exceptions, in which 
responsibility for the violation may be thought to rest upon the owner, 
at least in part.4 
B. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
§17.6. Motor vehicle insurance; Failure of insured to cooperate in 
defense. It is characteristic of insurance litigation that it tends to raise 
broad questions of principle under the guise of problems of procedure 
or of interpretation of the policy's words. This truth has been abun-
dantly illustrated by the judicial decisions of the present year. The 
case of Gleason v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co.! has now been be-
fore the Supreme Judicial Court three times. 
Gleason held a motor vehicle liability policy with Hardware Mu-
tual which included guest coverage. A guest sued him for personal 
injuries. Hardware Mutual, convinced that Gleason had lied to their 
attorney about the circumstances of the accident, withdrew from the 
defense. Judgment went against Gleason, and the guest brought a 
bill in equity against Gleason and Hardware Mutual to reach and 
apply the policy claim. This bill was dismissed on the ground that 
"failure to tell the truth is not cooperation" and that Hardware Mu-
tual was excused by Gleason's violation of the cooperation clause. 
Gleason then brought his own action against Hardware Mutual for 
indemnity under the policy. Mutual pleaded the dismissal of the bill 
in equity against it as res judicata, and the Supreme Judicial Court 
overruled a demurrer to this plea. Trial resulted in a directed verdict 
for Hardware on the plea of res judicata; but the Supreme Judicial 
Court sustained Gleason's exceptions on the ground that he did not 
participate actively as a litigant adverse to Hardware in the equity 
suit. A second trial resulted in a verdict for Gleason; but the Su-
preme Judicial Court sustained Hardware's exceptions, and ordered 
final judgment in its favor on the ground that Gleason's failure to 
cooperate was clearly proved. 
It seems unfortunate that Hardware was thus compelled to argue 
twice the law of res judicata and to try the same issue of fact to the 
same conclusion twice. In view of this decision it would seem that 
insurers who may have occasion to defend suits to reach and apply 
in the future would be well advised to file a cross-bill against the in-
3 Id., c. 412. 
4 Id., c. 417. 
til §J7.6. 1324 Mass. 695, 88 N.E.2d 632 (19,19); 329 Mass. 56, 106 N.E.2d 266 (1952); 
331 Mass. 703, 122 N.E.2d 381 (1954). 
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sured for a judicial declaration of nonliability under the Declaratory 
Judgments Act.2 Such a cross-bill appears to be authorized by the 
rules which the Supreme Judicial Court adopted in 1952 S as it is in 
analagous cases under the Federal Rules.4 
In Crompton v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty CO.5 the Supreme 
Judicial Court found it necessary to explain to the defendant that 
the familiar clause in the standard automobile liability insurance 
policy protecting "any other person responsible for the operation of 
the motor vehicle with the express or implied consent of the named 
insured" is legally valid and effectual according to its terms. The 
defendant contended that the plaintiff, not being a "party" to the 
contract, but a mere "third party beneficiary," had no legal rights. 
It is an unhappy commentary on the state of legal learning in Massa-
chusetts that this latter proposition in regard to third party benefici-
aries' which was never law in Massachusetts, and which never had any 
foundation except in the misinterpretation of a few old decisions, 
should now be seriously advanced as a ground for invalidating an 
established insurance practice, so as to require the Supreme Judicial 
Court to demonstrate its fallaciousness at length. 
§17.7. Life and accident insurance; Military service exception. In 
Gudewicz v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance CO.,1 a life in-
surance policy provided double indemnity for death by external, 
violent, and accidental means. The double indemnity, however, was 
not payable "if such death occurs while the insured is in military, 
naval, or air service in time of war, whether such war be declared or 
undeclared." The insured died on June 25, 1951, during the hos-
tilities in Korea, as the result of an automobile accident in Virginia 
while he was on an unexpired furlough from his naval station in 
North Carolina. The Court held that the insured was "in the naval 
service," and that his death occurred "in time of war." Probably the 
decision on both issues is in harmony with the more numerous au-
thorities, but on both issues the decision raises deeper questions than 
those involved in the correct interpretation of the words. It can be " 
argued that any provision of an insurance policy which makes re-
covery of the agreed indemnity depend upon facts having no con-
nection with the loss or with its causes operates as an illegal for-
feiture and is, therefore, pro tanto void. There are statutes2 and 
judicial decisionss to that effect. 
2 G.L., c. 231A. 
S Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted January 28, 1952; 
Rules for the Regulation of Practice at Common Law - in Equity, Rule 13. 
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g). 
5 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 935, 129 N.E.2d 139. 
§17.7. 1331 Mass 752, 122 N.E.2d 900 (1954). 
2 Neb. Rev. Stat. §44-358 (Supp. 1952); N.H. Laws 1942, c. 326, §4; N.Y. Insurance 
Law §150. 
S Prudential Insurance Co. v. South, 179 Ga. 653, 177 S.E. 499 (1934); Young v. 
Casualty Life &: Insurance Co. of Tennessee, 204 S.C. 386, 29 S.E.2d 482 (1944). 
5
Gardner: Chapter 17: Insurance
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1955
